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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant, James Constructors, Inc. ("James"), submits this
reply brief for the purpose of answering new matters that were
raised in the brief of respondent, Salt Lake City Corporation
(the "City").

The City has argued that, (1) James made no showing before
the district court which would suggest the existence of any issue
of fact relative to dismissal of its complaint; (2) theories of
rescission and quantum meruit are raised for the first time on
appeal; (3) the question of ambiguity of the contract was not
raised in the court below; and (4) the court lacks jurisdiction
because James?s notice of appeal was not filed within the time
required by Rule 4, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Whether there are issues of fact that would preclude granting of summary judgment is implicit in every motion for summary
judgment, because one cannot be granted unless there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Moreover, James's "Memorandum in

Opposition to Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment," devotes thirteen paragraphs to facts it contends have a bearing upon the interpretation of the contract.

In

those thirteen paragraphs, contract provisions are cited which
suggest an ambiguity in the contract in that they appear to be
contrary to contractual provisions relied upon by the City
(R.64-70).

It is certainly clear that James and the City take

differing views of the interpretation of the contract based upon
various contractual provisions.
The complaint filed by James refers specifically to the
wrongful termination of its contract with the City (R.5), and
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paragraph 22 of the complaint sets out conduct of the City which
constitutes total breach of the contract (R.7).
The City's argument that the question of which party had the
duty to select bedding material and backfill is involved only in
the complaint of the City against James, which has not yet been
determined, is not correct.

Paragraph 10 of James's complaint

raises the very question of who had the duty to determine which
material was to be used for bedding and backfill (R.4).
On page 13 of its memorandum (R.66), James argued to the
trial court that it was entitled to rescission of its contract
and compensation in quantum meruit for the services performed.
James was not obligated to appeal from the judgment entered
on May 4, 1988, inasmuch as that judgment was modified by a subsequent judgment entered on June 1, 1988.

The trial court had

jurisdiction to enter the judgment of June 1, 1988, and if it did
so erroneously, because the amendment came after the ten-day
period prescribed by rule, this was error only and did not affect
the jurisdiction of the appellate courts.

Moreover, if it were

error, it was invited error, the City having prepared and presented to the court the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment entered June 1, 1988; and if it were error, it is error
that is being raised for the first time on appeal and should not
be considered by the court.

There was no cross-appeal.
-3-

ARGUMENT
I.
The Questions of Ambiguity of the Contract and Whether There
Was Any Genuine Issue of Material Fact Were Properly Before
the Trial Court, and Were Not Raised for the First Time on
Appeal.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets out the conditions for granting a summary judgment:
* * * The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. * * *
The City has suggested in its argument that there was no
issue of fact because no affidavit was filed by James, but affidavits are not necessary if factual matters are shown by the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.

Here the record is replete with discovery accom-

plished prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment,
and deposition testimony is appended to James1s memorandum.

The

very fact that James referred these factual matters to the court
suggests that there are issues of fact bearing upon interpretation of the contract.

There are many cases in which

cross-motions for summary judgment are made, each party contending that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
-4-

But the fact

that both parties so contend does not relieve the court of its
obligation to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, because the absence of such an issue is the sine qua
non for summary judgments.

In Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design

Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981), our Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Stewart, said:
As an initial consideration, we know that the filing of
cross-motions for summary judgment does not mean that this
case may be finally disposed of as a matter of law.
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not ipso facto dissipate factual issues even though both parties contend for the
purposes of their motion that they are entitled to prevail
because there are no material issues of fact.
The opinion then quotes a particularly apt statement from 6
Moore1 s Federal Practice 11 56.13 at 341-344 (2d Ed. 1976).
II.
Questions of Restitution and the Right to Recover on a Quantum Meruit Theory Were Not Raised for the First Time in this
Appeal.
The City has argued that the question of who had the obligation to determine whether bedding and backfill material was suitable for use on the project was not involved in James's claim
against the City, but only in the City's claim against James,
which has not yet been determined.
James's complaint (R.3-5) contains the following averments:
7. Defendant's engineer or other representatives were
required to test the native soil removed from the pipeline
trench to determine its suitability for bedding and
-5-

backfilling purposes. Defendant was under a duty to inform
plaintiff of the soil test results and failed to do so.
8. Pursuant to the contract, plaintiff was obligated
to compact all bedding and backfill material to comply with
standards set forth in the contract documents. Defendant's
engineer or other representatives were required to test the
compaction of the bedding and backfill to determine compliance with the the contract specifications. Defendant was
under a duty to inform plaintiff of the compaction test
results and failed to inform plaintiff of any deficiencies
concerning compaction test results in a timely manner.
•

*

*

10. Defendant was under a duty to authorize the plaintiff to use bedding material, imported backfill material
when native material would not meet contract specifications.
Defendant breached this duty to plaintiff, resulting in certain areas of trench failure and possible damage to the
pipe.
The following points were raised in James's memorandum to
the trial court:
1.

Responsibility for selection of bedding and backfill was

placed on the City by the terms of the contract (R.658);
2.

The City is responsible for any failure due to insuffi-

ciency of the native bedding and backfill and impliedly warranted
that the native bedding and backfill specified in the contract
was sufficient (R.660);
3.

James was entitled to rely upon results of compaction

tests communicated to it by representatives of the City (R.662);
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4.

Exculpatory contract boiler plate contained in the gen-

eral provisions cannot modify the contract technical provisions
(R.665);
5.

James was entitled to rescission of its contract and to

compensation in quantum meruit for services performed (R.666);
6.

James is entitled to payment for extra work claims

alleged in its complaint under a theory of quantum meruit
(R.668).
At R.669 it is pointed out in the argument that the City's
action constituted a repudiation or total breach of the contract.
III.
The Notice of Appeal was Filed Within the Time Required by
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
An order of partial summary judgment was entered by the
court on May 4, 1988, but it was not a final judgment because it
did not dispose of the entire case.

Thereafter, on May 17, 1988,

the court signed and filed a certificate as required by Rule
54(b), U.R.Civ.P., which made the judgment of May 4, 1988, a
final judgment for purposes of appeal.

Almost immediately ques-

tions were raised by James as to the form of the judgment, though
this was done by letter rather than a motion to amend.

However,

because of the provisions of Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the objections made in the letter should be interpreted as
-7-

a motion to amend the judgment.

The letter and a response to it

by the City were filed within the time required by Rule 59 for
amendment of a judgment (R.983).
Thereafter, the City submitted to the trial judge proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law and a new order of partial summary judgment, which were signed and entered on June 1,
1988.

The City argues that the time to appeal ran from the date

of certification under Rule 54(b), that the notice of appeal
filed on June 21, was too late, and that this court, therefore,
has no jurisdiction to decide this appeal.

It is the position of

the City that what it calls the "duplicative order" of June 1,
1988, had no effect upon the running of the time for appeal.
The judgment entered on June 1, however, was the last judgment entered in this case and one which amended the judgment of
May 4, 1988, at least with respect to the date of the judgment.
None of the cases cited by the City involved a situation in
which the final judgment was entered after the certification.

At

first glance, the Kansas case, Dennis v. Southeastern Kansas Gas
Co. , 227 Kan. 872, 610 P.2d 627 (1980), seems to support the
City's position in that the date of certification commenced the
running of the appeal time although a summary judgment was filed
three days later; but under Kansas law, a judgment becomes final
and appealable upon the filing of a "journal entry," which in
-8-

Dennis occurred on the same date as the certification.
Even assuming that the letter sent to the court cannot be
treated as a motion to amend, and that the court's entry of the
new judgment on June 1, 1988, constituted error because it was
entered beyond the ten days for amendment of a judgment as
prescribed by Rule 59, the error did not affect the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court or this court.
The 30-day period within which to file an appeal is set by
Rule 4, Rules of Utah Supreme Court, but filing the appeal within
the time provided by that rule is not a jurisdictional requirement because Rule 1(d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,
provides:
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as established by law.
Article VIII, Sec. 3, Utah Constitution, specifies that the
Supreme Court "shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to
issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any
cause," and under 78-2-2, Utah Code 1988, the Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction over "all orders, judgments, and decrees
of any court of record over which the court of appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction."
-9-

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has already ruled on the
question of jurisdiction.
After filing of the appeal, the City filed with the Utah
Supreme Court on July 26, 1988, a motion for summary disposition
and dismissal of the appeal.

Point III of the motion raised

exactly the same question that the City is raising now, i.e.,
that the notice of appeal was not timely because it was not filed
within thirty days after certification of the judgment on May 17,
1988.
On August 19, 1988, the Utah Supreme Court issued the following order:
Salt Lake City Corporation's motion for summary disposition
and dismissal of appeal is this date denied, and the case is
reserved for plenary review.
Inasmuch as this court has jurisdiction, the only argument available to the City is that the court's amendment of the judgment on
June 1, 1988, was error.

But the City is in no position to claim

error because it did not cross-appeal the court's amendment of
the judgment.

Moreover, if there were error, it was invited by

the City's submission of the findings, conclusion and judgment
entered on June 1, and invited error may not be relied upon for
reversal of a judgment.

Pettinqill v. Pekins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272

P.2d 185, 186 (1954); 5 Am. Jur.2d, Appeal and Error,
§ 713.
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CONCLUSION
The issues raised in James's brief are issues that were
raised before the trial court, though sometimes in slightly different terms, and are properly before this court for review.

The

court has jurisdiction to review them, James's appeal having been
perfected.

The appeal should be disposed of on its merits, and

the case remanded to the District Court of Salt Lake County for
trial.
Respectfully submitted,
BQOB£

Roe (SlgnN)

Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, A
Professional Corporat
Attorneys for Appellant
James Constructors, Inc
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